/{app_slug}/v1/auth/passkey/verifyComplete a passwordless passkey sign-in
Verifies the assertion against the challenge from `/auth/passkey/options` and mints a session. The authenticator MUST have performed user verification (biometric / PIN) — a presence-only tap is refused on this path whatever the app policy says, because the passkey is the only authentication happening. Tokens carry `amr: ["webauthn"]` and a fresh `mfa_at`, so a passkey sign-in satisfies MFA-recency policies without a second step.
Path parameters
app_slug*stringSlug of the app.
Request body
credential*objectThe `PublicKeyCredential` returned by `navigator.credentials.get()` for the challenge from `/auth/passkey/options`. ArrayBuffers base64url-encoded.
Response · 200 Session + tokens minted.
result*objectAlways `session` here: a session was minted. Discriminates the sign-in results (`session`, `mfa_required`, `mfa_enrollment_required`).
access_token*stringShort-lived JWT signed with the app-scoped JWKS key. Carries sub, role, permissions[], type=end_user.
refresh_token*stringLong-lived opaque-ish JWT used to mint a new access token via /auth/refresh. Rotated on use.
token_type*stringAlways `Bearer`.
Example: "Bearer"
expires_in*numberAccess-token lifetime in seconds.
Example: 3600
password_warningsarrayNon-fatal notes about the password that was just set. Present only on `signup` and `accept-invite`, and only when the app runs `password_breach_check: "warn"` and the password was found in a public breach corpus — the value is then `["breached"]` and the session is minted anyway, so the client can prompt the user to change it. The key is ABSENT (not an empty array) when there is nothing to report; do not branch on its length without checking that it exists. Apps on the default `block` never see it — a breached password is refused with 400 `PASSWORD_BREACHED`.
Example: ["breached"]
mfa_enrollment_due_atstring · date-timePresent only when the app runs `mfa: "required"`, the user holds no enabled factor, and the account is still inside `mfa_grace_days` of its creation. The session IS minted; this is the deadline after which sign-in will start returning `mfa_enrollment_required` instead, so a client can prompt rather than block. Absent in every other case.
Example
Request
POST https://api.auth.productcraft.co/{app_slug}/v1/auth/passkey/verify
Content-Type: application/json
{
"credential": {}
}Response
{
"result": {},
"access_token": "string",
"refresh_token": "string",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
"password_warnings": [
"breached"
],
"mfa_enrollment_due_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
}